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Beyond	temporality:		
Notes	on	the	anthropology	of	time	from	a	shrinking	fieldsite	
								A	‘normal’	house	is	built	to	last	for	somewhere	between	eighty	and	a	hundred	years.	At	least,	this	is	what	my	architect	informants	in	the	East	German	city	of	Hoyerswerda	tell	me.	In	their	understanding,	such	normal	life	expectancy	refers	to	any	given	building:	detached	private	homes,	communal	apartment	houses,	or	high-rise	office	buildings.	This	is	how	one	builds	a	proper	building.	More	specifically,	this	is	how	these	architects	have	been	taught	to	design	them.	This	expected	lifespan	describes	what	anthropologists	might	refer	to	as	the	‘temporality’	of	these	buildings.	However,	as	I	will	show,	such	temporal	prescriptions	more	often	than	not	fail	to	stand	the	test	of	time,	literally	in	this	case.	To	anthropologically	account	for	even	such	solid	objects’	(material)	existence	in	(social	and	physical)	time,	we	should	embrace	a	lesson	these	architects	from	Hoyerswerda	learned	quickly	following	the	changes	of	1989:	that	times	themselves	might	suddenly	and	most	unexpectedly	change.	The	actual	existence	of	an	apartment	building	in	Hoyerswerda,	regardless	of	its	actual	past	and	future,	therefore	remains	indeterminate	in	the	present,	and	rightfully	–	like	other	objects	–	evades	concrete	ascriptions	of	temporality.	Before	setting	out	the	general	argument	of	this	article,	let	me	introduce	my	informants	further.	
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	 In	Hoyerswerda’s	socialist	Neustadt	(New	City),	these	architects	have	constructed	a	whole	city	from	scratch	by	deploying	the	aforementioned	temporal	logic.	The	New	City’s	construction	process	began	in	the	mid-1950s	and	lasted	until	the	ultimate	decline	of	the	very	state	for	which	Hoyerswerda	was	to	become	the	second	socialist	model	city.	The	socialist	part	of	Germany,	the	German	Democratic	Republic	(GDR),	had	great	hopes	in	its	housing	initiative.		Like	the	rest	of	Germany,	indeed,	all	of	Europe	and	many	other	places	in	the	world,	the	GDR’s	territory	lay	bare	and	devastated	after	World	War	II,	facing	an	existential	housing	crisis.	The	–	at	its	time,	vanguard	–	construction	of	apartment	houses	solely	with	industrially	prefabricated	concrete	units,	so-called	‘Platten’	or	panels,	seemed	to	offer	the	much	needed	technological	fix.	At	first	seven	so-called	living	districts,	‘Wohnkomplexe’	(in	short:	‘WK’),	grew	adjacent	to	Hoyerswerda’s	Old	City.	Later	a	total	of	ten	composed	the	main	settlement	for	the	GDR’s	most	important	brown	coal	industrial	complex.	Hoyerswerda	became	the	national	Miners’	and	Energy	
Workers’	City.	During	that	time,	the	new,	mostly	young	Hoyerswerdians	continued	to	arrive	from	all	parts	of	the	socialist	republic.	They	came	to	find	both	a	job	in	the	mines	and	a	much	desired	modern	apartment,	with	hot	water	from	the	tab	and	central	heating.	They	came	to	inhabit	a	continuously	provisional	urban	space	of	an	ever-expanding	city,	the	entire	infrastructure	of	which	–	schools,	kindergartens	and	district	shopping	centres	(so-called	‘Nahversorger’)	–	was	built	with	the	same	construction	technology.			 		 Altogether,	Hoyerswerda’s	state-owned	residential	housing	combine	produced	more	than	350	different	kinds	of	these	panels,	as	a	former	architect	proudly	underlines	during	a	tour	through	Neustadt.	He	and	some	of	his	former	colleagues	took	me	on	this	tour	in	spring	2009,	towards	the	end	of	my	eighteen	months	of	fieldwork	in	Hoyerswerda,	in	order	to	offer	their	perspectives	on	the	changes	dramatically	affecting	their	city.	Standing	in	front	of	their	former	headquarter,	the	architect	recounts	how	this	
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building	–	in	the	1970s	a	state-of-the-art	building	in	terms	of	air	conditioning	and	construction	method	–	was	a	few	years	ago	transformed	from	an	office	building	into	an	elderly-friendly	apartment	house,	long	after	the	urban	planning	unit	had	been	dissolved.	Nothing	about	the	contemporary	building	recalls	its	former	vanguard	qualities.	‘At	least	it	still	stands!’	is	the	sharp	remark	of	his	friend,	a	cynical,	recently	retired	construction	engineer.	He	gazes	over	to	living	district	number	eight	(WK		8),	the	first	of	the	later	added	districts.	I	am	told	that	in	the	1970s,	this	district	had	the	world’s	second	highest	population	density,	just	after	a	district	in	Tokyo.	Throughout	the	last	ten	years	it	has	been	harshly	hit	by	the	city’s	demolition	strategies.	The	district’s	former	three	schools	have	long	been	torn	down;	a	school	reunion	later	that	year	with	more	than	a	thousand	attendants	took	place	on	the	resulting	empty	meadows.			 To	the	architects’	surprise,	new	houses	are	being	built	in	this	area:	private	property	developments	of	single-family	detached	houses.	It	is	a	rare	occasion	to	see	cranes	constructing	rather	then	deconstructing	human	housing	space	in	what	the	Federal	Office	for	Building	and	Regional	Planning	had	then	recently	named	‘Germany’s	fastest	shrinking	city’;	however,	what	they	build	seems	all	the	more	old-fashioned,	at	least	in	architectural	terms.	And	yet	these	new	houses	still	entail	a	promise	of	a	better	future,	especially	so	since	a	third	of	Neustadt’s	apartment	blocks	have	already	been	demolished,	not	after	eighty	or	hundred	years,	as	expected	at	their	erection,	but	after	only	forty	years	and	sometimes	even	less	than	two	decades.	This	unforeseen	dimension	of	demolition	resulted	from	the	bitter	fact	that	Hoyerswerda	had	lost	more	than	half	of	its	population	over	the	last	twenty	years.	Neustadt’s	population	alone	shrunk	from	
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65,000	before	the	fall	of	the	Berlin	wall	to	approximately	20,000	inhabitants	in	20151,	a	decline	of	more	than	two	thirds.			 For	those	who	had	invested	their	whole	professional	life	into	the	erection	of	Neustadt,	the	unprecedented	outmigration	–	especially	of	the	young	and	well-educated	–	and	the	subsequent	deconstruction	of	now	redundant	urban	space	came	as	a	shock.	Under	such	circumstances,	the	city’s	former	architects	were	easily	subjected	to	ascriptions	of	temporality,	too,	for	instance,	by	the	new	local	political	elites;	as	their	houses	they	were	seen	as	being	‘of	the	(socialist)	past’	and	with	‘no	future’.	The	former	experts,	however,	soon	accepted	this	process	of	shrinkage.	In	ardent	protests	and	without	any	so-called	‘post-socialist’	form	of	nostalgia,	they	advocated	for	a	qualitatively	better	deconstruction	strategy.	Most	importantly,	the	city	should	be	‘un-built’	not	randomly,	but	from	its	outskirts	towards	the	already	alarmingly	porous	centre.	In	a	renewed	struggle	between	architects	and	political	leaders,	which	had	already	characterised	Neustadt’s	construction	during	socialism,	they	often	urged	for	a	proper	development	plan,	architectural	expert	supervision	and	more	experimental	reuse	and	reconstruction	approaches.	In	opposition	to	what	they	see	as	a	rather	mediocre,	unsystematic	urban	management	by	the	new	elites,	they	argue	that	the	city	shall	retain	a	certain	cohesive	‘form’,	and	all	reconstruction	should	follow	a	binding	building	code.	Next	to	the	influential,	although	similarly	marginalised	local	cultural	elite,	they	are	the	ones	who	most	successfully	challenge	the	city’s	‘evacuation	of	the	near	future’	–	to	use	Jane	Guyer’s	(2007)	felicitous	term.	In	a	city,	which	even	its	inhabitants	often	refer	to	as	being	of	‘no	hope’	and	‘no	future’,	they	force	the	local	government	to	account	for	its	lack	of	an	urban	planning	vision.	For	that,	they	stage	local	debates	on	the	city’s	future,	
																																																								1	Cf.	http://www.hoyerswerda.de/documente/Statistik/2_3_nach_Stadtteilen_31122014.pdf	(last	accessed:	17.11.2015)	
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organised	by	the	societies	and	clubs	they	founded	for	this	purpose,	and	flood	the	local	newspaper	editors	with	erudite	letters.		 Despite	these	critical	public	interventions,	they	remain	surprisingly	ambiguous	about	these	new	private	property	developments	in	WK	8.	On	one	hand,	my	architect	friends	are	bound	to	criticise	the	post-modern	aesthetics	of	these	differently	standardised,	but	similarly	industrially	pre-fabricated	houses.	On	the	other	hand,	they	appreciate	the	hopeful	sign	that	people	are	starting	to	build	again	in	their	city.	Interestingly,	they	do	not	remark	on	the	life	expectancy	of	those	privately	owned	houses.	But	perhaps	there	is	not	much	to	be	said.	These	private	houses	simply	seem	to	be	unusually	safe	in	a	still	deteriorating	environment.	Their	presumed	‘temporality’	entails	the	promise	of	endurance	despite	their	socialist	predecessors’	currently	bleak	fate.	How	is	it	that	these	detached	houses	are	expected	to	stand	the	test	of	time	more	comfortably	than	their	slightly	older	counterparts?	Why	are	they	seen	to	have	a	different	‘temporality’	at	all?													Beyond	Shrinkage,	Beyond	Temporality	
	Initially,	I	wanted	to	start	this	paper	in	living	district	number	ten,	which	is	the	youngest	Neustadt	district.	Or	rather,	which	has	been	its	youngest	district.	It	is	in	WK	10	that	the	city	is	most	intensely	affected	by	the	process	of	shrinkage.	The	WK’s	fate	usually	and	most	effectively	incorporates	the	common	narrative	of	decline.	Factually,	indeed,	WK	10	has	ceased	to	exist.	Of	the	original	37	apartment	blocks,	only	one	remains	today.	Most	of	the	streets	in	front	of	the	demolished	blocks	have	been	demolished,	too.	Where	the	apartments	once	stood,	new	grass	is	growing;	with	nothing	else	remaining,	it	is	hard	to	
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picture	their	former	impressive	materiality.	However,	even	this	fairly	self-evident	outcome	of	large-scale	demolition	has	not	been	as	predetermined	as	we	might	think.	Throughout	the	last	two	decades,	WK	10	has	seen	many	surprises	despite	the	fact	that	its	recent	past	has	been	all	too	suggestive	of	its	rather	dystopian	present.	For	reasons	that	will	hopefully	become	clear,	I	have	chosen	to	start	with	an	anecdote	that	adds	one	more	surprise	to	this	otherwise	predictable	story	of	post-industrial	decline	and	shrinkage:	the	newly	built	detached	houses	in	WK	8.	With	its	help	I	aim	to	scrutinize	the	term	‘temporality’,	particularly	the	temporal	underpinnings	of	yet	other	–	this	time:	anthropological	–	narratives,	analytics	and	theories.	These	underpinnings	comprise	the	more	or	less	explicit	temporal	logics	deployed	in	anthropological	analyses,	as	much	as	anthropologists’	own	expectations,	hopes,	fears,	memories	and	understandings	of	history	and	causation	(cf.	Ringel,	2012).	I	take	it	that	they	mostly	come	into	play	in	the	way	we	–	as	anthropologists	–	position	the	objects	of	our	analysis	in	time.		 To	be	frank	from	the	start:	This	scrutiny	stems	from	a	general	inability	on	my	part	to	comprehend	what	exactly	is	meant	when	the	term	is	used	(cf.	Hodges,	2008:	414-416;	Bear,	2014:	18).	What	I	have	in	mind	are	the	many	prescriptions	of	particular	temporal	characteristics	(in	form	of	specific	historicities,	futurities	or	temporalities)	onto	specific	groups,	situations,	sets	of	practices,	institutions	and	material	objects	as	well	as	onto	certain	ideas	and	concepts.	These	prescriptions	entail	pre-theoretical	or,	in	the	case	of	time,	metaphysical	commitments	(Moore	2004),	for	instance,	to	theories	of	causation,	endurance	and	change.	The	objects	of	analysis,	as	I	will	show	in	more	detail	below,	become	thus	easily	envisioned	as	having	a	certain	temporal	property,	which	somewhat	predetermines	their	existence	in	time.	And	we,	by	representing	them,	seem	to	know	how	time	has	evolved	and	is	to	evolve	in	and	around	them,	and	which	turn	history	will	take	given	that	we	can	discern	these	properties.		
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	 I	do	not	want	to	be	too	pedantic	about	the	use	of	a	term,	because	most	analytic	terms	have	theoretical	pitfalls	whilst	still	being	heuristically	useful.	However,	I	believe	that	there	is	more	to	be	said.	For	instance,	Daalsgard	and	Nielsen	(2013:	2)	have	convincingly	urged	us	to	clarify	‘how	discrete	temporalities	can	be	studied	and	represented’.	In	contrast,	I	believe	that	to	ascribe	one	or	many	discrete	temporalities,	recently	referred	to	as	multiple,	multi-	or	poly-temporalities	(Pels,	2015;	Dalsgaard	and	Nielsen,	2013:	11;	Birth,	2008;	Knight	2014)	is	analytically	misleading.	As	actual	properties	(or	qualities,	as	both	Daalsgard	and	Nielsen,	2013,	and	James	and	Mills,	2005,	might	have	it)	of	the	given	object	of	analysis,	they	entail	implications	about	both	the	object’s	actual	past	and	future,	tentatively	‘truthful’	representations	of	which	I	find	to	be	of	a	questionable	nature	given	our	discipline’s	prominent	methodology.			 However,	there	are	further	reasons	for	rejecting	ascriptions	of	temporalities.	For	one,	especially	in	times	that	are	widely	perceived	as	‘accelerated’	and	‘insecure’	(cf.	Morosanu	and	Ringel,	2016;	Daalsgard	and	Nielsen,	2013),	many	anthropologists	voice	their	own	concerns	with	time,	and	particularly	with	the	future.	By	reproducing	the	hegemonic	notion	of	acceleration	or	other	dominant	temporal	regimes,	such	as	the	one	of	crisis,	they	might	neglect	forms	of	temporal	agency	variously	depicted	by	their	informants	(cf.	Ringel	and	Morosanu,	2016;	Ringel,	2013;	Friedman,	2007).	But	despite	understandable	concerns	with	the	future,	even	our	theoretical	relations	to	the	actual	pasts	(i.e.	history)	remain	problematic.	Many	anthropologists	still	argue	that	more	space	should	be	given	to	the	temporal	dimension	of	the	past	(e.g.,	James	and	Mills,	2005)	despite	poignant	critiques	of	the	danger	of	‘homochronism’	(Birth	2008).	Kevin	Birth	sees	‘homochronism’	as	a	failed	response	to	what	Fabian’s	Time	and	the	Other	sparked	as	the	constant	‘linking	of	ethnographies	to	time	and	to	history’	(ibid.:	3).	And	so	we	still	find	most	monographs	and	articles,	including	this	one,	to	start	with	historical	
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descriptions.	Some	of	them	reach	back	in	time	for	hundreds	of	years	(in	Pels,	2015,	for	instance,	the	timeframe	of	modern	futurism	is	500	years)	as	if	this	would	assist	in	explaining	the	present.	What	is	the	metaphysical	grounding	for	such	anthropological	narratives	of	history,	and	what	kind	of	histories	are	we	to	give	our	objects	and	subjects,	for	which	analytical	gains?		 In	contrast	to	a	general	historical	approach	(which	differs	from	Hirsch	and	Stewart’s	2005	pioneering	redefinition	of	historicity)	and	for	analytical	purposes,	I	therefore	propose	a	presentist	perspective,	which	I	want	to	be	understood	as	an	analytical	approach	to	the	world	whose	focus	on	the	present	vehemently	opposes	any	determining	role	of	the	past.	This	approach	mirrors	Rabinow’s	inspiring	‘anthropology	of	the	contemporary’	(Rabinow	2003,	2008).	However,	as	I	will	show	in	more	detail	below,	it	is	also	already	ingrained	in	anthropology’s	defining	methodology	of	fieldwork.	By	strongly	emphasizing	indeterminacy,	it	convincingly	accounts	for	the	role	the	future	plays	in	human	lives.	Whilst	discussing	the	emergent	anthropology	of	the	future	in	order	to	rethink	our	discipline’s	relationship	to	the	past,	I	advance	this	presentist	framework	and	argue	for	an	exclusively	epistemological	–	not	an	ontological	–	approach	to	time.	As	I	will	show	in	the	next	section,	when	the	term	‘temporality’	is	used	in	an	ontological	and/or	cultural	sense	(in	a	gesture	to	account	for	‘non-Western’	ontological	resistance	to	‘Western’	acceleration,	as	recently	done	by	Iparraguirre,	2015,	or	simply	by	depicting	the	Trinidadians	and	‘their’	or	the	‘local’	temporality’,	as	in	Birth,	2008:	7,	18),	it	distracts	our	attention	from	exactly	the	multiple	and	indeterminate	kinds	of	agency	that	humans	exercise	with	regards	to	time	(cf.	Flaherty	2003;	Ringel	2016).				
‘Temporality’	as	Culture	and	Property	
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		 Most	current	anthropological	approaches	to	time	work	with	two	different	meanings	of	temporality,	and	my	argument	is	positioned	against	both.	First,	temporality	is	often	conceptualised	as	something	akin	to	–	or	part	of	–	culture	(for	instance	in	the	infamous	Sahlins-Obeyesekere	debate:	Sahlins,	1985,	1995;	Obeyesekere,	1992;	Borofsky,	1997;	cf.	Bear	2014:	13).	This	approach	tries	to	create	an	image	of	a	certain	group	of	people	adhering	to	a	particular	and	often	limited,	homogeneous	understanding	of	–	and	relationship	–	to	time.	Traditionally,	we	think	of	circular	and	linear	or	modern	and	pre-modern	conceptualisations	of	time,	whose	ontological,	homogenizing	characters	have	already	been	criticised	(cf.	Howe,	1981,	on	Geertz,	1977,	and	Bloch,	1973).	In	Hoyerswerda’s	case	such	categorization	can	also	be	done	with	the	term	post-socialism,	subsuming	the	city’s	present	existence	under	the	influence	of	its	socialist	past,	thereby	explaining	its	current	failure	with	its	inhabitants’	presumed	(cultural	or	ontological)	‘being	stuck’	in	this	past.			 Similar	historicising	temporal	attributions,	mostly	vis-à-vis	people	presumably	without	history,	have	first	been	criticised	by	scholars	such	as	Johannes	Fabian	(1983),	Eric	Wolf	(1982)	and	Dipresh	Chakrabarty	(2000).	However,	as	I	hinted	at	already,	these	critics	have	arguably	only	given	‘people	without	history’	the	history	that	others	had	denied	them	(see	Birth,	2008).	Recently,	scholars	rather	attend	to	the	heterogeneous	multiplicity	of	temporal	relations	in	any	social	arrangement	(Bear,	2014;	Ringel,	2013;	Ssorin-Chaikov,	2006;	James	and	Mills,	2005;	Orlove,	2002).	By	that,	they	also	open	up	the	anthropological	analysis	of	time	for	the	future.	They	have,	as	Laura	Bear	underlined,	overcome	‘the	sole	focus	on	the	past	that	characterized	the	rapprochement	between	anthropology	and	history	in	the	1980s’	(2014:	3).	I	am	going	to	discuss	this	with	reference	to	the	anthropology	of	post-socialism	and	its	particular	upkeep	of	the	past	as	a	
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reference	point	for	present	analyses,	which	so	forcefully	contradicts	the	multiplicity	of	temporal	attributions,	logics,	and	tropes	so	easily	found	in	my	own	presumably	post-socialist	fieldsite.	In	its	vast	variety,	this	multiplicity	escapes	a	general	attribution	such	as	the	one	that	is	implied	by	‘post-socialism’.			 I	also	argue	that	by	changing	one’s	temporal	perspective	on	the	present	from	the	past	to	the	future,	we	will	necessarily	remain	presentist	and	are	invited	to	replace	such	attributions	of	‘temporality’	with	solid	ethnographic	detail	and	with	no	loss	in	analytical	clarity	and	interpretive	power.	By	empirically	indulging	in	my	informants’	contested	presents,	my	intention	is	not	to	give	them	a	(non-,	pre-	or	generally	socialist)	history,	but	to	pay	credit	to	the	fact	that	they	are	more	concerned	with	the	future,	and	that	neither	they	nor	we	can	know	how	this	future	is	going	to	turn	out,	or	how	–	if	at	all	–	the	past	might	have	determined	it.		 What	counts	for	the	‘culture’	of	people,	which	is	seen	to	entail	a	hegemonic	temporality,	also	works	for	other	objects	of	analysis.	The	second,	although	more	implicit	and	subtle	meaning	of	temporality	thus	occurs	when	it	is	perceived	as	a	property	of	any	such	object.	As	most	dictionaries	agree,	‘temporality’	initially	only	refers	to	the	more	general	‘state	or	quality	of	being	temporal’2.	In	itself,	this	definition	lacks	heuristic	or	analytic	value	–	indeed,	things	do	exist	in	time,	or	space,	for	that	matter.	Many	anthropologists,	including	myself,	have	used	it	precisely	in	this	vein	in	order	to	underline	that	the	dimension	of	time	needs	to	be	attended	to,	or	for	thinking	through	the	abstract	temporal	logics	of	certain	phenomena	or	tropes:	the	one	of	shrinkage	in	my	case	(Ringel,	2013),	but	also	of	hope	and	‘no	hope’	(Miyazaki,	2004	and	2010),	crisis	(Knight	and	Stewart,	2016),	infrastructure	(Bowker,	2015),	landscape	(Ingold,	1993),	
																																																								2	Cf.	www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/temporality	and	www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/temporality	,	both	last	accessed	17.11.2016.	
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plans	(Abram	and	Weszkalnys	2013);	gifts	to	Soviet	leaders	(Ssorin-Chaikov,	2006)	or	analytical	terms	such	as	problematization,	apparatus	and	assemblages	(Rabinow	2003:	55-56),	to	only	name	a	few.			 However,	there	is	a	problem	when	we	specify	the	term.	As	few	dictionaries	add:	‘like	spatial	position,	temporality	is	an	intrinsic	property	of	the	object’3.	If	a	certain	temporality	(e.g.	a	‘modern	temporality’	or	the	‘temporality	of	modernity’)	is	then	held	to	be	an	intrinsic	property	of	a	particular	culture,	group,	era	or	any	other	object	of	anthropological	analysis	–	from	kinship	structures	to	particular	social	relations,	from	social	institutions	to	specific	practices,	from	textiles	and	masks	to	whole	buildings	–	the	problem	is	the	establishment	of	the	specificity	of	this	property	of	being	temporal,	i.e.	to	establish	how	exactly	these	objects	exist	in	time.			 On	the	one	hand,	we	face	the	same	homogenising	danger	as	before.	For	instance,	when	Miyazaki	defines	the	temporality	of	no	hope,	he	thus	claims	that	any	situation	of	‘no	hope’	is	subject	to	the	same	temporal	logic,	which	fully	pervades	this	situation.	Similar	to	Ferguson’s	2009	critique	of	neoliberalism,	this	prescription	empties	our	analyses	by	making	it	too	predictable.	On	the	other,	we	ascribe	temporal	properties	as	if	they	actually	existed:	every	landscape,	for	instance,	in	Ingold’s	view,	has	one	temporality	(potentially	the	sum	of	all	events	inscribed	into	it)	and	if	I	could	comprehensively	know	this	total	history,	I	could	see	where	the	landscape	is	going,	so	to	speak.	Or	I	would	know	that	a	socialist	apartment	block	from	the	1960s	will	surely	only	cease	to	exist	somewhere	between	2040-60.			 If	we	combine	these	two	challenges,	we	see	that	any	‘post-’ascriptions	(post-socialist;	post-colonial;	post-industrial)	implicitly	impose	and	inscribe	a	certain	temporal	logic	as	a	property	by	presuming	that	the	object	has	a	past	–	which	is	logically																																																									3	Cf.	e.g.	www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/temporality	,	last	accessed	17.11.2016.	
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implied	in	the	prefix	–	and	that	its	current	existence	is,	if	not	determined,	then	at	least	conditioned	or	affected	by	it.	But	how	can	a	whole	city,	region	or	era	be	convincingly	characterised	as	‘post-socialist’?	Or	why	is	a	house	in	socialist	modernity	convincingly	expected	to	exist	for	somewhere	between	eighty	and	one	hundred	years?	Apart	from	the	–	in	philosophical	terms	–	still	arguable	fact	that	things,	people,	ideas	and	such	houses	do	have	a	past,	present	and	future,	is	this	existence	in	time	actually	predetermined	as	a	certain	temporality	in	form	of	an	intrinsic	property	would	suggest?	In	contrast,	I	propose	to	refrain	from	such	attributions	as	much	as	the	use	of	the	word	‘temporality’	in	anthropological	analysis	altogether.	I	find	intellectual	encouragement	for	this	in	the	philosophical	theory	known	as	presentism,	and	in	particular	in	one	of	its	current	formulations	in	the	metaphysics	of	time.	For	my	purposes,	this	reformulation	allows	the	inclusion	of	the	future	into	my	analysis.			 My	remaining	argument	thus	falls	in	three	parts,	dealing	with	the	anthropology	of	post-socialism,	the	anthropology	of	the	future	and	the	problem	of	presentism	in	this	order.	In	conclusion,	I	will	define	so-called	‘temporality’	akin	to	Hirsch	and	Stewart’s	(2005)	take	on	historicity	not	as	an	ontological	property,	but	as	a	thoroughly	epistemic	and	social	phenomenon.	Throughout	this	paper,	I	echo	my	informants’	surprise	about	situations	in	which	‘objects’	–	such	as	apartment	houses	–	take	on	an	unexpected	temporal	existence.	I	will	add	a	short	remark	on	why	it	is	subsequently	more	important	to	explain	endurance	rather	than	change	when	approaching	the	issue	of	time	from	a	presentist	point	of	view	and	through	the	lens	of	the	future	(cf.	Ringel,	2014).		 My	general	claim,	then,	is	that	temporality	should	not	be	perceived	as	a	given,	innate,	or	intrinsic	quality,	but	a	matter	of	contingent	and	contested	social	practice.	Since	most	of	this	practice	is	knowledge	practice	(i.e.	representational	and	non-representational	references	to	the	temporal	dimensions	of	the	past	and	the	future),	I	
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propose	to	get	the	ontological	musings	quickly	out	of	the	way	and	follow	an	epistemological	approach	to	time.	This	means	that	when	we	study	‘temporality’	it	should	not	be	taken	for	granted	as	a	metaphysical	quality,	apart	from	the	unsurprising	fact	that	things	exist	in	time.	Instead,	since	rhythms	can	be	disturbed,	houses	unexpectedly	demolished	and	social	relations	dissolved,	it	is	the	work	that	goes	into	upholding	certain	temporal	orders,	structures	and	rhythms	that	should	catch	our	attention	(see	Flaherty	2003).	The	permanence	and	the	efficacy	of	temporal	practices,	however,	has	to	be	explained.	In	contrast	to	Hodges’	stimulating	call	for	a	specific	and	consciously	applied	kind	of	‘temporal	ontology’	(for	him	a	particular	Deleuzian	understanding	of	time;	cf.	Hodges,	2008),	I	here	propose	to	sidestep	this	problem	of	ontology	altogether.	For	an	alternative	approach	(with	a	clear	ontological	basis,	but	a	much	more	epistemological	outlook),	I	find	presentism	to	provide	the	most	convincing	approach.				
Post-Socialism	and	no	End		Johannes	Fabian’s	1983	critique	of	anthropological	writing	strategies	scrutinises	the	assignation	of	temporal	qualities	in	form	of	the	positioning	of	others	as	‘outside’	history.	As	he	convincingly	argues,	ethnographic	writing	strategies	have	thoroughly	political,	indeed,	ideological	underpinnings	as	well	as	repercussions	(Fabian,	1983).	While	I	do	not	claim	that	current	anthropology	has	not	learned	from	his	intervention,	I	still	want	to	recount	the	subdiscipline’s	critical	engagements	with	the	term	‘post-socialism’	and	its	struggle	with	a	similar	positioning,	the	one	of	all	things	post-socialist	as	outside	of	‘normal’	Western,	capitalist	history,	constantly	being	stuck	in	its	socialist	past’s	enduring	repercussions.	I	claim	that	the	term	fails	to	describe	social	reality	in	
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Hoyerswerda,	foremost	because	there	is	obviously	more	to	a	‘post-socialist’	city	than	its	socialist	past,	as	many	anthropologists	have	shown	for	their	ethnographic	cases	(cf.	Berdahl,	1999;	Boyer,	2006;	even	Kaneff,	2003;	cf.	also	Hann,	2002;	Gilbert,	2006).	Let	me	repeat	the	urge	for	temporal	multiplicity	(instead	of	multiple	temporalities)	with	reference	to	the	same	kind	of	houses	mentioned	above,	before	taking	the	argument	one	step	further.	For	that,	I	will	have	to	construct	a	‘history’	fitting	to	the	broken,	indeterminate	and	non-post-socialist	narrative	I	advance	here.	This	reference	to	the	past	fulfils	its	present	purposes	and	is	for	many	reasons	selective.				 Some	of	the	blocks	in	WK	10	were	only	finished	in	1990,	when	the	so-called	‘changes’	of	1989	had	already	happened.	During	that	time,	the	GDR	had	run	out	of	financial	means.	On	a	visit	to	a	freelance	journalist	in	2008,	I	could	experience	the	results.	At	the	downstairs	buzzer,	my	interview	partner	said	that	they	live	on	sixth	floor.	‘But	there	is	no	elevator;	you	will	have	to	walk	all	the	way	up.’	In	contrast	to	all	other	WKs,	he	tells	me	later,	the	blocks	in	WK	10	feature	unusual	six	floors.	GDR	building	law	usually	demanded	an	elevator	in	every	building	with	more	than	five	floors	apartments,	so	that	the	architects	either	built	five	floor	apartment	houses	or	much	higher.	But	here	an	exceptional	permission	was	issued.	With	a	similar	exception,	even	the	quality	of	the	concrete	was	lowered	for	this	WK,	as	an	architect	had	previously	pointed	out	to	me.	Although	the	blocks’	unusually	porous	material	texture	all	too	suggestively	mirrors	the	increasingly	precarious	times	of	its	erection,	we	should	remember	that	the	future	for	which	they	were	built	was	still	one	of	a	glorious	communist	future.	We	would	now	presume	that	this	relation	to	the	future	immediately	changed	with	the	fall	of	socialism	in	1989/1990.		 On	entry	into	my	interviewee’s	flat	I	recognize	the	typical	layout	that	I	have	so	often	seen	in	Hoyerswerda.	In	the	small	kitchen,	I	am	presented	with	a	wonderful	view	
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over	the	fields	towards	a	nearby	village.	I	should	see	the	sunset	–	better	than	on	Mallorca,	my	hosts	underline	passionately.	Then	they	get	out	photo	albums	and	I	see	WK	10	in	its	infancy:	the	trees,	then	only	recently	planted,	look	surprisingly	small	next	to	the	newly	finished	blocks.	I	see	photos	of	their	two	young	daughters	with	their	friends	on	a	playground	in	front	of	their	entrance.	Even	though	the	pictures	are	in	black-and-white,	you	can	see	that	the	whole	WK	is	well-tended.	Now	the	journalists’	daughters	have	both	found	jobs	in	West	German	Munich.	Since	most	of	the	houses	around	them	already	stand	empty	and	ready	for	deconstruction,	the	journalist	and	his	wife	are	seriously	consider	moving	to	Munich	as	well.	There	are	few	job	prospects	here,	and	they	want	to	be	close	to	their	children	and	future	grandchildren.	But	they	would	miss	the	sunset,	they	said.			 This	could	be	the	end	to	a	common	story	of	post-socialist	decline.	However,	the	journalist’s	story	continues.	He	had	been	the	official	spokesman	for	WK	10	from	1986-1990,	something	like	a	mayor	for	the	district’s	4,500	inhabitants.	Although	‘his’	WK	10	currently	seems	far	advanced	on	the	path	to	total	demolition,	he	remembers	that	at	least	throughout	the	1990s	there	was	still	much	prospect	for	the	district.	Although	many	had	to	move	away,	those	remaining	were	still	fighting	for	the	district.	He	remembers	one	fight	most	vividly.	Everybody	involved	knew:	the	blocks’	maintenance	is	key	to	securing	their	futures.	As	in	GDR	times,	the	inhabitants	had	volunteered	to	take	over	several	tasks	to	avoid	deterioration;	one	was	to	tend	the	surrounding	green	spaces.	The	cooperative	landlord,	however,	in	whose	power	it	is	to	decide	on	the	building’s	futures,	opted	against	that:	the	outside	taps	for	water	were	removed,	and	the	green	space	maintenance	outsourced	to	a	private	company.	This	post-post-socialist	infrastructural	change	indicates	that	the	historical	process	is	more	complicated	than	a	simple	historical	narrative	of	decline	suggests.	Similarly,	even	though	it,	at	first,	was	inconceivable	to	many	people	in	Hoyerswerda	that	the	youngest	of	Hoyerswerda’s	apartment	houses	
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could	be	demolished,	only	over	a	long	period	of	time	did	both	inhabitants’	expectation	and	urban	planning	strategies	change	in	combination	with	an	ever	increasing	and	accelerating	process	of	population	shrinkage.	The	for	long	much	appreciated	WK	10	outpost,	close	to	the	fields	as	well	as	to	a	main	federal	road,	was	only	gradually	given	up.	It	is	not	the	political	changes	of	1989/1990	that	brought	deconstruction,	it	is	a	continuous	and	less	determinate	series	of	practices,	events	and	contested	decisions	that	led	to	WK	10’s	only	retrospectively	doomed	(future)	present.	Its	demolition	was	not	predetermined.	If	the	landlord	had	decided	to	answer	the	comparatively	young,	committed	inhabitants’	demands	in	the	1990s,	WK	10	could	potentially	still	stand.			 As	we	can	see,	the	story	about	how	these	blocks	in	WK	10	have	overnight	lost	their	futures	and	found	themselves	in	novel,	postsocialist	times	that	had	to	lead	to	their	demolition	is	wrong;	although	it	looks	like	they	were	then	set	on	the	path	to	demolition,	the	story	unfolds	less	determinately.	And	I	do	not	even	mention	all	the	art	and	science	projects	(cf.	below)	that	spurred	hardly	unrealistic	fantasies	about	keeping	a	few	blocks	exactly	for	the	purpose	of	maintaining	them	as	free	spaces	for	art	interventions.	Are	these	blocks	then	post-socialist	or	can	their	existence	in	each	present	be	captured	with	different	attributes	–	despite	all	factual	fatal	outcomes	that	only	retrospectively	acquired	a	quality	of	inevitability?		 The	anthropology	of	post-socialism	faces	many	such	temporal	problems.	Initially,	it	studied	this	kind	of	social	reality	under	the	trope	of	post-socialism	as	opposed	to	the	paradigm	of	transition.	Katherine	Verdery’s	famous	book	title	from	the	mid-1990s	What	
was	socialism,	and	what	comes	next?	(Verdery,	1996)	summarizes	this	period’s	important	efforts	against	other	discipline’s	blatant	transitology	(cf.	also	Bridger	and	Pine,	1998;	Burawoy	and	Verdery,	1999;	Gal	and	Kligman,	2000;	Berdahl	et	al.,	2000).	However,	the	main	analytic	move	of	those	authors	was	to	question	the	powerful	
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prescription	of	a	Western	future	to	the	dramatic	process	of	rapid	transformation.	Like	many	of	their	informants,	they	barely	doubted	the	influence	of	the	socialist	past	on	the	usually	failing	post-socialist	presents.	To	use	Caroline	Humphrey’s	apt	phrasing,	anthropologists	of	post-socialism	were	tracing	the	‘unmaking	of	socialist	life’	(Humphrey,	2002),	particularly	in	order	to	argue	against	the	prescription	of	a	Western	future.			 In	the	early	2000s,	the	first	doubts	emerged	regarding	the	term’s	general	applicability.	Verdery	and	Humphrey,	but	also	Chris	Hann	and	Don	Kalb	tried	to	answer	the	question	‘Whither	Post-Socialism?’	by	proposing	a	spatially	larger	approach,	which	re-embeds	post-socialism	in	post-Cold	War	studies	of	globalisation	(Hann,	2002).	These	scholars	already	posed	the	question,	when	this	category	would	stop	making	sense,	i.e.	when	the	socialist	past	would	stop	effecting	the	post-socialist	present.	This	influence	was	seen	to	linger	in	people’s	ideas	and	experiences,	and	with	a	new	generation	devoid	of	these	experiences	it	would	disappear	(Hann,	Humphrey,	Verdery,	all	2002;	cf.	also	Haukanes	and	Trnka,	2013)		 More	recently,	particularly	scholars	working	in	Ex-Yugoslavia	have	continued	to	problematise	post-socialist	anthropology’s own ‘challenges with periodization’ (Gilbert et 
al., 2008; cf. Gilbert, 2006). They claim that post-socialist anthropologists face severe 
problems when trying to adequately position their informants in time. As a subfield of post-
socialist studies, the anthropology of East Germany (Berdahl, 2009; Borneman, 1992; Boyer, 
2001a&b, 2006; Gallinat, 2009; Glaeser, 2001; Ten Dyke, 2001) has been at pains to 
emphasise that such positioning always entails a political dimension. Daphne Berdahl and 
Dominic Boyer, in particular, have been increasingly critical about post-socialist 
anthropology’s own predicament of being fixated on the past, a predicament that mirrored the 
temporal logic imposed by West Germans on their Eastern counterparts in a wider, post-Cold 
War ideological project (cf. Berdahl, 2009, Boyer, 2006).  
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 In	fact,	East	German	post-socialist	references	to	the	socialist	past,	such	as	in	the	phenomenon	of	Ostalgie,	East	Germany’s	infamous	form	of	nostalgia,	are	not	a	matter	of	a	longing	for	the	GDR	past.	Instead,	they	express	otherwise	denied	and	silenced	concerns	with	the	present	(cf.	esp.	Berdahl,	1999,	2009)	or	even	a	longing	for	the	future	(Boyer,	2001a&b,	2006,	2010).		Berdahl	(2009),	for	instance,	interpreted	seemingly	nostalgic	expressions	as	remarks	on	the	future	because	of	the	socialist	past’s	distinct	feature	that	–	in	contrast	to	the	unpromising	post-socialist	present	–	it	actually	did	have	a	future.	The	socialist	past,	she	claimed	(Berdahl,	2009:	87ff),	continues	to	provide	at	least	a	rhetorical	resource	for	imagining	a	different	future.	It	assists	local	attempts	to	differently	recapture	the	quickly	evacuated	post-socialist	future.	Similarly,	Boyer’s	(2006)	two	phases	in	inner-German	national	temporal	politics	–	first,	the	total	devaluation	of	the	East	German	past	by	West	Germans;	and	second,	the	Western	gift	of	its	particular	re-historisation	–	both	deny	East	Germans	a	say	concerning	their	own	and	the	nation	state’s	future	(Boyer,	2006:	379;	also	2010:	26).		
 Without devaluing the impact of the past on such debates, which is so well rehearsed 
by studies of memory, loss and trauma (for example, Antze and Lambek, 1996; Knight 2014; 
Haukanes and Trnka, 2013), I argue that it is important to reintroduce further analytic 
complexity by re-emphasising the temporal dimension of the future. As increasingly argued 
(Boyer and Yurchak, 2010; Gilbert et al., 2008; Hann, 2002; Stenning and Hörschelmann, 
2008; Thelen 2011), it is time to specify in which instances the category of post-socialism 
remains of analytical value. The future might, as in my field-site, re-enter the stage of shared 
concerns through new problems introduced not by socialism’s legacy, but by contemporary 
problems with, and processes of, de-industrialisation, a neo-liberally orchestrated 
globalization and long-term repercussions of German reunification. It is ultimately a 
combination of these problems, which shape in unforeseen and accelerating manners my 
informants’ existence and subsequently the variety of temporal narratives they generate (cf. 
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Humphrey, 1998). Even more importantly: Whilst	attending,	as	Humphrey	convincingly	suggested,	‘whatever	other	frameworks	of	analysis	arise	from	within’	(Humphrey,	2002:	13-14),	we	encounter	an	endless	variety	of	local	concerns	with	the	future.	However,	before	they	can	be	attributed	to	a	coherent,	say,	‘temporality	of	shrinkage’,	let	me	point	out	that	even	in	high	modernist	(socialist)	times	quite	similar	predictions	of	a	worse	future	had	already	arisen.	Aforementioned	East	German	author	Brigitte	Reimann,	who	lived	in	Hoyerswerda	in	the	1960s,	noted	prophetically in her diary in 1969(!): ‘The coal is 
coming to an end. In twenty years, perhaps, Hoy[erswerda, F.R.] will be nothing more than a 
ghost town, like one of these abandoned gold digger towns.’ 	 Like	Berdahl	and	Boyer,	Andrew	Gilbert	et	al.	(2008:	11)	thus	envisioned	the	theoretical	contributions	of	the	studies	of	post-socialism	in	the	following	way:	‘If	anthropology	is	the	social	science	of	the	present,	it	ought	to	offer	insight	into	the	future	
in	the	present’	(Gilbert,	2008:	11;	cf.	Brandstädter	2012).	However,	in	the	post-socialist	literature,	this	inclusion	of	the	future	usually	takes	the	detour	to	the	past.	As	Brandstädter	writes,	for	instance,	it	‘is	in	their	orientation	to	the	future…	that	postsocialist	societies	share	a	common	predicament	with	their	own	socialist	past’	(2007:132).	Haukanes	and	Trnka	(2013b:	3)	also	underline	that	while	‘much	has	been	written	about	the	past	and	present	of	postsocialist	societies,	comparatively	less	attention	has	been	devoted	to	the	interconnections	between	people’s	past	experiences	and	future	expectations	in	these	sites.’	In	an	otherwise	convincing	statement,	again,	we	see	the	past	being	foregrounded	in	order	to	explain	the	present	and	the	future.	My	approach	in	contrast	scrutinizes	how	far	we	get	when	not	reading	relations	to	the	future	in	the	present	through	their	presumed	links	to	the	past,	but	in	their	own	right	(cf.	Knudsen	and	Frederiksen	2015:	3).	This	means	that	we	sidestep	what,	following	Haukanes	and	Trnka’s	analysis,	has	‘been	at	the	core	of	anthropological	analyses	of	
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postsocialism’,	namely	‘remembrance	and	forgetting’	(2013:	4),	in	order	to	dislodge	the	analyses	united	under	the	otherwise	productive	comparative	trope	of	post-socialism	from	its	strong	focus	on	the	past.			 Such	approach	fundamentally	questions	what,	in	her	2008	review	of	the	anthropology	of	post-socialism,	Buyandelgeriyn	perceives	as	the	post-socialist	temporality	of	‘uncertainty	as	a	state	of	dynamic	being’	(Buyandelgeriyn,	2008:	235),	in	which	the	socialist	past	at	times	manifests	itself	not	by	being	‘evoked	to	serve	the	uncertain	present’	(which	I	would	agree	with)	but	because,	for	example,	any	new	cultural	state	practices	‘are	directly	related	to	and	shaped	by	repercussions	of	the	socialist	state’	(ibid.:	246)	or	because	–	in	the	domain	of	gender	–	‘the	values	and	principles	from	socialism	were	able	to	appropriate,	shape,	and	modify	the…	Western	ideas	and	approaches’	(ibid.:	243).	If	there	is	anything	like	a	post-socialist	epoch,	I	argue,	it	currently	constitutes	a	new	present	demanding	altogether	new	solutions	for	newly	problematic	futures.	To	be	sure,	the	analytical	problems	of	a	certain	past-fixation	has	not	only	been	detected	for	post-socialism,	but	also	in	other	areas	of	anthropological	inquiry,	for	instance,	in	Melanesia	(Rollason,	2014).			 As	I	have	pointed	out	before,	in	Hoyerswerda,	we	encounter	such	problems	of	periodisation	with	the	emergence	of	a	new	dominant	context:	the	one	of	shrinkage.	This	trope	is	directed	towards	a	future	that	is	rendered	problematic.	Contrary	to	some	post-socialist	scholars’	usual	expectations,	my	informants	only	rarely	reference	the	socialist	past;	the	local	production	of	temporal	meaning	is	less	occupied	with	issues	of	former	‘eastern’	and	‘western’	Cold	War	politics	(cf.	Boyer,	2001a).	As	the	future	is	at	stake	and	widely	debated	in	manifold	local	discourses,	the	socialist	past	only	ever	remains	a	strategically	exploited	(cf.	Kaneff,	2003)	and	continuously	scarce	resource	(Appadurai,	1981)	amongst	other	concerns	and	other	resources.	Despite	its	dystopian	undertones,	
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the	context	of	shrinkage	is	often	productive	and	challenging	instead	of	disempowering	precisely	because	of	the	fact	that	it	enforces	a	relationship	to	the	future.		 This	process	has	long	overcome	what	we	might	perceive	as	the	post-socialist	context:	On	entering	Hoyerswerda	these	days,	there	is	another	abandoned	building,	which	does	not	fit	the	post-socialist	narrative	from	above.	Built	several	years	after	the	fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall,	the	local	Burger	King	branch	stands	as	empty	as	its	formerly	socialist	architectural	contemporaries.	Shrinkage	does	not	stop	in	front	of	even	younger	constructions.	Indeed,	so	many	other	post-socialist	developments	such	as	small	shopping	centres,	office	buildings	and	a	whole	business	park	at	Hoyerswerda’s	outskirts	are	abandoned,	too.	The	link	between	the	past	and	the	future	is	not	as	straightforward	as	we	might	believe,	but	how	can	we	account	for	this	indeterminacy	theoretically?	
  	
Problems	with	the	Anthropology	of	the	Future			
	 My	own	response	to	the	anthropology	of	post-socialism’s	inherent	danger	of	a	past-fixation	is	to	substitute	the	perspective	from	the	past	with	that	of	the	future,	thereby	closely	following	my	informants’	strategy.	I	claim	that	areas	of	inquiry	such	as	post-socialism	can	profit	from	the	still	emergent	and	unsurprisingly	fashionable	anthropology	of	the	future	(e.g.	Pelkmans,	2003;	Pedersen,	2012).	I	will	point	to	a	few	problems	of	this	body	of	literature	before	discussing	the	philosophical	concept	of	presentism.	I	do	so	in	order	to	underline	what	kind	of	analytical	and	empirical	object	the	future	in	anthropology	is,	and	which	repercussions	such	conceptualisation	has	for	our	approach	to	the	past,	and	time	more	generally.		 First	attempts	to	reconsider	the	dominance	of	the	past	in	the	discipline	of	anthropology,	particularly	following	the	historical	turn,	appeared	in	1992	with	two	
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hugely	influential	publications:	Nancy	Munn’s	seminal	article	on	‘The	Cultural	Anthropology	of	Time’	and	Alfred	Gell’s	inspiring	monograph	on	The	Anthropology	of	
Time.	As	Munn	specifies,	whilst	‘people	operate	in	a	present	that	is	always	infused…	with	pasts	and	futures’	(Munn,	1992:	115),	especially	‘futurity	is	poorly	tended	as	a	temporal	problem...	in	contrast	to	the	close	attention	given	to	‘the	past	in	the	present’’	(Munn,	1992:	116).	However,	the	future	–	arguably	more	so	than	the	past,	since	it	is	always	only	
not	yet	–	inherently	depends	on	being	represented	in	the	present,	which	poses	an	analytical	as	much	as	a	methodological	problem.	How	is	one	to	the	study	the	future?		 As	Barbara	Adam	had	emphasised	in	her	explicitly	presentist	approach	two	years	earlier,	‘[a]ny	reality	that	transcends	the	present	must	itself	be	exhibited	in	it’	(Adam,	1990:	38).	Gell	similarly	defines	the	future	as	‘inaccessible	except	as	a	representation,	an	imaginary	present’	(Gell,	1992:	288,	cf.	also	237-241).	Bamby	Schieffelin	supports	this	point	by	underlining	that	the	abundance	of	relations	to	the	future	proves	that	the	future	–	as	‘the	most	unknown	of	the	temporal	dimensions’	–	‘has	to	be	marked	in	the	present’	(both	Schieffelin,	2002:	12).	In	fact,	the	ethnographic	material	collected	in	the	present	–	or	presence	–	of	the	ethnographer	is	all	there	is	‘of	the	future’	at	any	given	time.	And	what	counts	for	one	temporal	dimension,	should,	if	we	follow	Adam’s	advice	properly,	also	count	for	the	other.			 In	Hoyerswerda	as	elsewhere,	there	is	no	shortage	of	temporal	material,	especially	not	concerning	the	future.	As	Rosenberg	and	Harding	in	their	edited	volume	on	the	Histories	of	the	Future	state,	the	current	‘remarkable	proliferation	of	words	and	images	about	the	future’	(2005:	3)	is	linked	to	a	‘swirl	of	uncertainty’,	due	to	which	futures	have	even	become	‘overdetermined’	(Rosenberg	and	Harding	2005:	4).	A	city	with	‘no	future’	is	exactly	a	place	for	studying	such	overdetermination,	since	the	future	has	been	existentially	rendered	problematic.	Methodologically,	however,	rather	than	
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asking	how	to	study	the	future,	I	have	to	pose	the	question	how	does	one	study	contemporary	knowledge	about	it?	As	Jane	Guyer	asks,	‘What	kind	of	‘stories’	does	imagination	create	when	the	reference	points	lie	in	the	future?’	(Guyer,	2007:	417).		
	 The	focus	on	the	future	as	an	epistemic	phenomenon	stems	from	the	problem	that	the	future	does	not	exist.	Or	rather	that	it	only	ever	exists	not	yet	(Bloch,	1959	[1986]).	Anthropologists,	more	so	than,	say,	historians,	I	argue,	can	take	refuge	in	theories	of	indeterminacy	and	contingency	to	counter	this	problem.	These	concepts	help	us	to	turn	this	analytic	vice	of	the	future	into	a	virtue,	welcoming	the	unpredictability	of	the	future	and	the	subsequent	under-	or	indeterminateness	of	the	present	(cf.	Nielsen	2011,	2014).	As	I	have	shown	elsewhere	(Ringel,	2012,	2014),	in	Hoyerswerda	the	representation	of	the	temporal	dimension	of	the	yet-to-come	in	an	indeterminate	present	entails	a	variety	of	different	ethnographic	material:	mundane	long-	and	short-term	decisions,	official	urban	planning	practices,	business	development	plans,	strategy	papers	of	local	social	clubs	and	associations,	private	and	public	investment	plans,	the	conceptualisation	and	organisation	of	future	socio-cultural	projects	and	so	forth.	It	also	comprises	more	intimate	aspects:	personal	future	prospects,	expectations	of	one’s	children’s	or	grandchildren’s	outmigration,	individual	feelings	of	fear,	hope,	and	despair,	issues	of	trust,	a	lack	of	self-confidence,	or	the	constricted	capacity	to	envision	one’s	own	life	in	the	future.		 		 A	practice-based	approach	to	time	and	knowledge	as	much	as	to	time	as	knowledge	(cf.	Rabinow,	1986)	throws	light	on	the	way	the	future	is	made	to	play	a	role	in	local	life.	It	has	a	longstanding	tradition	in	the	discipline	of	anthropology.	As	Gell,	again,	has	it,	claims	to	time	are	part	of	the	‘continuous	production	of	socially	useful	knowledge’	(Gell,	1992:	304),	a	set	of	‘contingent	beliefs’,	which	he	successfully	poses	against	‘the	doctrine	of	temporal	‘mentalities’	or	‘world-views’’	(both	Gell,	1992:	55).	
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Carol	Greenhouse	pushes	this	approach	to	time	further:	Since	‘social	time	has	no	practical	existence	or	intrinsic	logic	apart	from	its	contexts	of	use’,	(Greenhouse,	1996:	212)	we	must	attend	‘the	multiple	ways	in	which	the	nature	and	meaning	of	time	are	indeterminate	even	in	contexts	where	its	representation	is	most	explicit’	(Greenhouse,	1996:	221).			 Since	anthropology’s	defining	methodology	of	fieldwork	is	inherently	presentist,	it	is	hard	to	discern	the	‘temporal	property’	of	whatever	we	study	by	including	its	pasts	and	future,	especially	if	that	object’s	endurance	is	subject	to	a	context	of	accelerated	change	and	continuously	changing	retrospective	scrutiny.	Historians	with	a	long-term	historical	perspective,	in	contrast,	can	arguably	at	least	claim	to	be	able	to	represent	the	past.	However,	this	does	not	change	the	fact	that	in	any	given	moment	they	could	not	have	foreseen	what	was	to	happen	afterwards.	To	retrospectively	attribute	this	‘temporality’	as	if	particular	aspects	of	human	life	were	to	endure	or	to	change	independent	of	human	practice	is	not	only	theoretically	dubious;	it	is	part	of	a	deterministic	fallacy.	In	the	next	section,	I	expand	on	the	theory	of	presentism	in	order	to	show	how	to	circumvent	such	fallacies.				 		
The	Construction	of	‘Temporality’		 		 In	the	metaphysics	of	time,	presentism	is	the	account	of	time	which	holds	that	only	the	present	exists	while	the	past	and	future	are	in	some	way	unreal;	it	is	contrasted	with	eternalism	which	holds	that	the	past,	present	and	future	are	equally	real.	Accordingly,	presentism	resembles	the	approach	of	most	anthropologists	discussed	above	who	hold	that	both	the	past	and	the	future	do	not	exist	other	than	in	their	representations	in	the	present.	Kirsten	Hastrup’s	1990	definition	of	ethnographic	
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presentism	similarly	argues	that	this	form	of	presentism	is	not	just	a	literary	device;	it	is	the	essentially	presentist	methodological	approach	to	our	material	which	entails	our	discipline’s	‘necessary	construction	of	time’	(1990:	45).	Pushed	to	the	extreme,	as	Gell	so	convincingly	showed	in	his	discussion	of	the	temporal	quality	of	the	Magna	Carta,	it	does	not	matter	from	an	anthropological	point	of	view	whether	this	document	dates	from	1215	or	not.	What	matters	is	how	people	attach	meaning	to	it,	i.e.	whatever	temporality	or	historicity	they	construct	in	their	respective	presents.		 However,	ethnographic	presentism	faces	a	particular	problem.	It	can	easily	be	countered	by	scholars	who	emphasize	the	past	in	their	analysis	of	the	present,	some	of	whom	I	have	already	mentioned	above.	In	their	view,	the	present	might	indeed	be	open	to	the	future,	but	it	came	to	be	the	way	it	is	through	a	long	and	complex	process	of	historical	causation.	Hence,	for	them,	it	would	be	important	to	read,	for	example,	the	post-socialist	present	through	the	lens	of	the	socialist	past	or	to	give	people	without	history	their	own	history.	Rather	than	using	local	invocations	of	the	past	as	an	analytical	contrast	foil	for	eliciting	their	significance	in	the	present,	they	are	imbuing	the	present	with	a	temporal	property	we	might	refer	to	as	a	historically	determined	temporality.	This	seriously	downplays	the	influence	the	future	might	have	in	the	present;	it	also	gives	the	present	a	rather	limited	character	as	only	a	momentary	pause	in	an	ever	continuous	process	of	causation.	As	indicated	above,	the	theory	of	presentism	convincingly	reconciles	the	future	and	the	past	with	the	present.	
	 In	2006	the	philosopher	Craig	Bourne	published	a	monograph	called	A	Future	for	
Presentism.	I	will	spare	you	the	much	debated	philosophical	detail	and	only	focus	on	his	discussion	of	the	deterministic	fallacy. Regarding the future, Bourne points out something 
that most of us, I suppose, would happily agree with: Given a certain degree of contingency 
and indeterminacy, at any moment in time we face the probable emergence of a variety of 
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possible futures. This seems commonsensical and relates to the not-yet-real character of the 
future. However, even the fact that only one of all of these possible futures turns out to 
become the present (in the future) does not mean that this future (present) was predetermined 
to become present, i.e. that it somewhat pre-existed and then inevitably emerged in the future 
present. To take such an ex post facto construction as true constitutes a deterministic fallacy 
(cf. Bourne, 2006: 60f). This view arises because, in comparison with the future, the past is 
widely presumed to have another ontological status (cf. Ringel, 2016). Since it has once 
existed, it is seen to have had another temporal property than other potential pasts 
(respectively past futures), namely those which have not been realised. It is supposed that it 
was this particular temporal property, which made this past become a present. From a 
deterministic point of view, it is thus only the future-to-be that leans into – and has effects on 
– the present. But if we accept Bourne’s claim that the actual future, which turned out to 
become the present, was at no point predetermined to become the present, then all past 
presents were not ontologically predetermined either. This is not to say that due to the non-
existence of the future ‘presentists should treat the past in the same way’ (Bourne,	2006:	41).	The	actual	past	did	in	some	way	indeed	exist,	namely	once	as	a	present.	However,	I	precisely	challenge	the	ontological	status	we	attach	to	this	past	in	the	present	–	its	contemporary	quality.	As	we	see,	the	important	point	about	the	actual	past	is	that	–	as	with	any	present	–	it	was	not	predetermined	to	come	into	existence.	This	temporal	property	is	not	changed	by	the	fact	that	it	has	done	so.		 It	goes	without	saying	that	such	a	view	caters	conveniently	to	practice	theory,	phenomenological	approaches	and	the	methodology	of	fieldwork.	This	focus	on	the	present	also	leaves	us	luckily	barehanded	when	it	comes	to	causation.	It	does	not	disallow	comparison	with	the	past.	But	more	importantly,	it	allows	the	in-depth	attendance	to	all	temporal	relations	and	experiences	to	be	found	in	our	fieldsites’	presents.	The	construction	of	particular	temporal	properties	is	thereby	included,	but	
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only	on	our	informants’	side.	Let	me	give	you	yet	other	ethnographic	examples	of	the	local	construction	of	such	temporal	attributions.	Importantly,	it	is	obviously	a	chain	of	different	presents	that	we	are	able	to	encounter	throughout	fieldwork.	This	will,	however,	not	alter	the	continuously	indeterminate	temporal	existence	of	our	objects	of	analysis.	As	the	experiences	of	my	informants	prove:	any	future	might	hold	various	surprises,	as	past	futures	have	already	done. 	 One	often	repeated	story	in	Hoyerswerda	refers	to	the	unexpected	functional	change	of	a	particular	house	in	the	old	city.	Many	informants	saw	this	change	to	be	indicative	of	the	dramatic	demographic	changes	their	city	was	undergoing.	Originally	planned	as	a	residential	home	for	the	elderly	in	the	1950s	during	Neustadt’s	construction,	the	intended	use	of	this	building	faced	a	peculiar	problem:	there	just	were	not	enough	old	people	around.	The	city’s	age	average	was	as	low	as	27	years.	The	planners	were	quickly	convinced	that	the	building	was	to	become	a	kindergarten,	which	it	continued	to	be	until	the	mid-1990s.	Now,	since	Hoyerswerda	has	become	demographically	speaking	one	of	Germany’s	oldest	cities	with	an	age	average	above	50,	this	house	has	found	a	new,	or	rather,	it	has	found	its	old	function	–	and	finally	re-opened	as	a	home	for	the	elderly	thus	evading	its	own	deconstruction.	Its	actual	use	at	no	point	was	predetermined	by	the	characteristics	it	was	imbued	with;	in	new	presents	it	had	to	answer	to	new	possible	futures.				 I	argue	that	it	is	the	aspect	of	such	stories’	unexpected	turns	that	should	be	taken	analytically	more	seriously	in	our	accounts	of	the	present.	Consider	the	case	of	the	art	works	of	Hoyerswerda’s	First	Sculptors’	Symposium.	Located	in	WK	9,	one	of	the	youngest	districts	and	after	WK	10	the	one	most	severely	effected	by	demolition,	they	once	materialised	the	claims	to	a	rather	different	future.	As	its	centrepiece	daringly	wishes:	‘Happiness	should	always	spread	its	wings	over	the	city	of	Hoyerswerda’.	Again,	
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in	1970,	when	this	popular	symposium	was	conducted,	such	a	sculpted	speech	act	was	felicitous.	With	at	first	the	district	and	then	its	shopping	centre	severely	deteriorating	in	the	late	1990s,	these	sculptures	seemed	lost	–	stuck	in	a	different	past	with	a	different	future,	as	was	their	immediate	built	environment.	Meanwhile,	due	to	unexpected	federal	funding	city	officials	and	the	communal	housing	companies	have	moved	the	whole	symposium	to	the	remaining	clearance	area	of	Hoyerswerda’s	first	demolished	apartment	house	in	WK	2.	There,	they	have	been	paired	up	with	high	mirrors,	becoming	other	pieces	of	art,	in	yet	another	context.	They	definitely	seem	more	secure	there;	as	with	the	apartments	blocks	surrounding	them:	their	future	existence	seems	to	be	procured	through	recent	investments.			 These	two	examples	of	the	local	epistemic	production	of	particular	objects’	temporal	qualities	are	part	of	a	large	variety	of	local	temporal	attributions,	many	of	which	are	directed	towards	the	future.	Such	attributions	are	a	central	part	of	processes	of	communal	self-assurance.	They	quickly	enter	Hoyerswerda’s	many	socio-political	negotiations.	One	very	last	example	is	the	fight	for	a	future	for	the	building	Braugasse	1,	the	former	Children	and	Youth	Club	located	in	the	centre	of	the	Old	Town,	which	was	originally	opened	as	a	Ball	Room	in	the	late	19th	century.	This	building	had	been	closed	according	to	German	building	law	in	1998,	indeed,	approximately	one	hundred	years	after	its	erection.	Throughout	the	first	decade	of	the	21st	century	it	was	in	continuous	danger	of	either	being	demolished	or	replaced	by	an	apartment	house	for	pensioners.	Its	insecure	future	sparked	the	formation	of	the	activist	group	Braugasse	1	e.V.,	which	was	aimed	at	giving	the	building	a	different	future,	or	rather	a	future	in	the	first	place.	This	unexpectedly	successful	civic	intervention	changed	the	building’s	existence	in	time.	As	I	describe	elsewhere	(Ringel,	2014),	throughout	the	club	members’	endless	efforts,	the	building’s	various	re-narrated	pasts	and	newly	envisioned	futures	were	led	into	the	field	
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of	contestation	by	all	people	concerned,	but	especially	by	the	supporters	of	a	swift	renovation.	The	building’s	existence	in	time	was	stressed,	foremost	its	long	history	of	socio-cultural	importance,	in	order	to	claim	its	right	for	the	future.	As	a	property	of	the	building,	this	fabricated	temporality,	a	well-defined	futurity,	had	to	be	imposed,	since	its	material	property	depended	urgently	on	actual	physical	support.	After	all,	a	“normal”	building	is	only	built	for	80	till	100	years.	To	many	peoples’	surprise,	this	building	was	indeed	saved	and	is	by	now	fully	renovated	and	reopened	as	a	socio-cultural	centre	in	a	city	still	continuously	deteriorating.	The	social	construction	and	imposition	of	temporality,	again,	suggests	that	the	issue	of	time	forcefully	poses	itself	as	a	matter	of	contested	knowledge	practices,	imbued	with	local	relevance,	and	their	effects.	If	we	as	anthropologists	want	to	intervene	in	these	constructions,	then	we	should	attend	such	relevance.	The	theory	of	presentism,	as	I	have	argued,	might	provide	a	valuable	theoretical	framework	for	this.				
Conclusion:	Towards	a	Non-Ontology	of	Time				 The	ways	in	which	people	relate	to	the	future	are	not	fixed	and	stable.	Indeed,	there	is	no	time	as	such	and	there	are,	I	argue,	no	discrete	temporalities.	Rather,	such	temporal	matters	evolve	in	(and	are	reproduced	by)	everyday	practice,	in	which	all	things	social,	political	and	ethical	are	at	stake.	In	my	work,	I	understand	the	relation	between	time	and	knowledge	in	two	different	ways.	First,	I	chart	the	ways	in	which	knowledge	(in	content,	form	and	practice)	changes	over	time:	new	concepts	emerge,	are	negotiated,	and	have	particular	effects	(cf.	Hirsch	and	Stewart	2005).	I	hold	that	this	process	is	indeterminate.	Second,	I	consider	the	temporal	dimension	of	knowledge	as	the	many	different	ways	in	which	people	reach	out	in	time	to	the	past	or	the	future,	both	
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near	and	far.	Despite	their	own	conditions	of	possibility,	I	also	hold	these	temporal	knowledge	practices	not	to	be	fully	determined.	This	approach	to	time	does	not	deploy	the	concept	of	a	discrete	temporality	as	attributed	to	particular	objects,	forms,	groups,	and	social	relations.	Instead	of	discovering	some	inherent	quality	of	how	these	objects	of	anthropological	analysis	exist	in	time,	I	approach	issues	of	time	via	the	knowledge	that	is	produced	by,	or	the	politics	that	are	done	with,	them,	via	the	effects	this	knowledge	has,	and	its	own	indeterminate	existence	in	time.	I	thereby	accept	Bourne’s	argument	against	deterministic	fallacies	by	claiming	that	nothing	has	a	temporal	character	for	a	presentist	apart	from	being	(in	the)	present.		 If	we	take	Barbara	Adam’s	aforementioned	claim	that	‘[a]ny	reality	that	transcends	the	present	must	itself	be	exhibited	in	it’	(1990:	38)	seriously,	we	stay	inherently	presentist	in	our	analysis.	As	Marilyn	Strathern	has	it	in	her	Partial	
Connections,	‘in	one	sense,	everything	is	in	place:	sociality,	the	values,	relationships.	But	what	must	be	constantly	made	and	remade,	invented	afresh,	are	the	forms	in	which	such	things	are	to	appear’	(Strathern,	1991:	98).	I	include	in	this	ongoing	process	of	explication	the	many	temporal	considerations	that	bear	relevance	in	my	fieldsite,	presuming	that	‘time’	is	already	in	place.	In	this	vein,	we	can	analytically	transcend	the	simple	‘recognition	that	people	make	history	in	conditions	outside	their	control’	(Adam,	1990:	98)	and	treat	the	role	of	the	past	and	the	future	in	present	temporal	practices	in	Strathern’s	formulation	as	‘a	concern	with	representation,	with	how	people	make	things	known	to	themselves’	(Strathern,	2005:	42).	Time,	as	Arjun	Appadurai	has	pointed	out,	is	as	much	part	of	the	Production	of	Locality	(1995)	as	spatial	concerns;	locality	(including	temporal	embeddedness)	thereby	is	not	‘a	non-negotiable	here-and-now’	(Appadurai	1995:	206).	Munn	(1992)	even	more	forcefully	demands	us	to	attend	practices	of	strategic	temporalisation	as	indicative	of	‘ways	in	which	time	is	not	merely	
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‘lived,’	but	‘constructed’	in	the	living’	(Munn,	1992:	109).	Her	term	of	temporalisation	might	be	helpful	in	this	regard:	it	‘views	time	as	a	symbolic	process	continually	being	produced	in	everyday	practices’	(Munn,	1992:	116).	Such	processes	of	production	of	temporal	knowledge	are	open	to	political	conflict	and	social	negotiation.	Indeed,	particularly	the	city’s	problematic	present	incites	a	broad	variety	of	temporal	references.	Because	the	process	of	shrinkage	has	profoundly	challenged	its	inhabitants’	self-understanding,	manifold	ideas,	interpretations	and	imaginations	drawn	from	different	pasts	(post-socialist,	socialist	as	well	as	pre-socialist,	for	that	matter)	and	directed	towards	competing	future	visions	have	become	essential	tools	for	dealing	with	the	current	changes.	Whether	in	private	or	public	discourses,	the	contemporary	problematisation	of	life	invites	conflicting	temporal	notions.			 By	analytically	emphasising	the	future	as	an	important	experiential	dimension,	I	have	countered	the	clear-cut	linear	temporal	narrative	of	post-socialist	transition,	taking	theories	on	the	influence	of	the	post-socialist	and	other	pasts,	literally,	into	the	future	–	or	rather	into	the	present.	Importantly,	I	am	not	imposing	yet	another	temporality.	The	philosophical	presentism	shortly	discussed	only	helped	me	to	see	how	ethnographic	presentism	can	be	given	increased	analytical	value.	I	am	in	no	way	advocating	what	Jane	Guyer	so	convincingly	criticizes	as	some	form	of	neo-liberal	‘enforced	presentism’	paired	with	‘fantasy	futurism’	(Guyer,	2007:	409f).	Nor	am	I	endorsing	some	idea	of	‘enforced	futurism’,	which	is	so	suggestively	tenable	in	my	shrinking	fieldsite.	Rather,	with	the	help	of	the	anthropology	of	the	future,	I	have	proposed	a	new	perspective	on	present	matters	whilst	nevertheless	being	aware	of	the	analytic	as	much	as	political	value	of	historical	analyses.	Due	to	our	presentist	methodology,	however,	we	as	anthropologists	should	be	careful	when	prescribing	temporal	properties	and	all-encompassing	temporal	logics	to	whatever	we	study.	Therefore,	I	propose	a	presentist	
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exploration	of	the	role	time	in	general	as	well	as	the	past	and	especially	the	future	are	made	to	play	in	the	present.		 		 Moreover,	if	we	analytically	uphold	the	contingent	and	indeterminate	quality	of	our	objects	of	analysis	(may	they	be	social	institutions	and	relations	or	socialist	apartment	blocks),	we	might	be	able	to	focus	more	thoroughly	on	their	endurance.	Indeed,	I	find	that	much	more	fascinating	than	their	change,	i.e.	to	attend	the,	in	my	eyes	always	surprising,	social,	epistemic	and	actual	maintenance	work	of	my	informants	and	the	only	ever	retrospectively	reconstructable	persistence	or	stubborness	of	any	given	object	of	analysis	(Ringel,	2014).	As	Hodges	(2008)	could	hopefully	agree	to	in	his	Deleuzian	inspired	temporal	ontology	of	flux,	endurance,	then,	is	not	a	property	of	a	given	object,	but	something	continuously	made	and	facilitated.	Change,	for	that	matter,	does	not	happen	at	random	due	to	some	ominous	temporal	or	historical	force;	like	continuity	it	is	subject	to	ever	new	and	indeterminate	presents.		 Most	importantly,	I	am	also	not	abandoning	the	study	of	time	by	critically	engaging	with	the	category	of	temporality.	In	contrast,	I	am	arguing	for	temporally	expanding	our	analyses.	However,	there	is	a	clear-cut	difference	between	attending	to	a	variety	of	temporal	notions	and	the	analytical	prescription	of	temporality.	The	way	people	exist	in	time,	amongst	other	things,	also	depends	on	practices	of	representation	and	variously	imaginable	forms	of	temporal	agency;	it	should	not	be	presumed	as	an	ontological	given.		 With	that	in	mind,	I	return	to	Hoyerswerda	Neustadt	for	the	last	time,	more	precisely	to	WK	10,	the	district	that	I	did	not	start	my	paper	with.	Despite	many	artistic	and	socio-cultural	temporary	interventions	in	–	and	subsequent	late	revivals	of	–	some	of	the	WK	10	blocks,	virtually	all	of	them	but	one	have	found	their	retrospectively	logical,	yet	radical	destination	in	their	own	destruction.	Their	windows	have	been	taken	
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to	some	Eastern	European	country	to	be	included	in	new	apartment	houses;	the	rubble	remaining	from	its	walls	was	expensively	sold	for	the	erection	of	new	infrastructure	projects	like	roads	and	bridges.	However,	at	one	of	these	temporary	uses,	the	socio-cultural	project	‘Out	of	Time’	or	‘TimeOut’	(in	German:	‘Auszeit’),	something	unforeseen	happened	yet	again.			 As	the	organizers	pointed	out,	the	project	specifically	focused	on	Hoyerswerda’s	present	–	for	a	change	–	and	not	on	its	future.	In	one	of	its	workshops,	a	group	of	people	came	up	with	a	new	idea	for	the	blocks’	ultimate	survival.	They	had	in	mind	the	realization	of	at	least	one	of	the	two	following	ideas:	Either,	they	wanted	to	produce	a	QR	code	path	through	WK	10	and	all	other	areas	of	deconstruction.	Once	attached	to	remaining	trees	and	lampposts,	these	black-and-white	squared	matrix	barcodes	will	store	old	images	and	other	information	about	the	demolished	buildings,	rendering	them	accessible	in	future	presents	by	any	smartphone	user.	Or	else	they	wanted	to	create	an	app,	which	allows	for	the	real-time	production	of	a	so-called	‘augmented	reality’	of	WK	10’s	past.	Any	future	visitor	will	then	be	able	to	virtually	see	how	these	blocks	looked	like	and	where	exactly	they	stood.	Somewhat	uncannily,	the	blocks	could	then	–	with	the	help	of	this	new	technology	–	forever	belong	to	the	present,	i.e.	to	all	of	the	presents	yet	to	come.	Although,	alternatively,	the	proposed	technology	might	also	soon	be	out	of	fashion	and	this	high-fly	representation	of	the	past	might	disappear	in	the	internet’s	endless	oblivion.	Or	the	idea	might	never	be	realized	in	the	first	place.	We	cannot	know.	
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